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Fiscal Crisis

(Figure 1)

After climbing steadily for nearly a decade, a dramatic decline in per pupil
revenue in 2012 sent the Philadelphia school district reeling.
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NOTE: Inflation-adjusted revenue per student includes charter school students and revenue paid out to charter schools.
SOURCE : School District of Philadelphia, Comprehensive Financial Report, June 30, 2013
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THE

Philadelphia

School District’s
Ongoing Financial Crisis
Each year, as predictably as classes end in

June, the School District of Philadelphia faces a
budget crisis for the coming school year. In 2014,
the School Reform Commission, the school district’s state-imposed governing body, for the first
time and in violation of the city charter, refused to
pass a budget, arguing that there were insufficient
funds to run the schools responsibly. Philadelphia’s
mayor Michael Nutter said, “It is a sad day in public
service that we find children being held on the railroad tracks awaiting some rescue
to come from somewhere.” And
yet, casting the school children of
Philadelphia in the Perils of Pauline
has become a yearly ritual.
In the summer of 2013, the district superintendent announced
that schools might not open on
time, as severe budget cuts had led
to insufficient staffing. The budgets
of many individual schools allowed
for no counselors, no secretaries to assist principals or answer
telephones, and no arts or sports programs. With
a last-minute financial-aid pledge from the city,
some laid-off personnel were recalled, and schools
opened on time. But the district was still in such
dire straits that Philadelphia’s newspapers launched
a drive to obtain pencils, paper, and other basic

supplies. This is no way to run a school system,
much less the eighth largest in the United States.
We investigate why these school crises keep
recurring. The most recent spate of crises actually
started in the 2012 school year (herein school years
are referenced by the spring in which the school
year ended). Between 2011 and 2012, the district
cut almost 17 percent of its workforce, including
nearly 2,000 teachers. How did the district get into
this mess? Some people blame managers for failing
to look ahead and budget carefully,
in particular, for failing to plan for
the predictable end of federal stimulus funds. Structural factors have
also been cited: It may be that the
State of Pennsylvania does too little
for public education. The City of
Philadelphia may either tax itself too
lightly or allocate too much money
to other city services at the expense
of the school district. Some of the
financial burden may be the result
of student flight to charter schools,
whose share of Philadelphia students has grown
dramatically in recent years. We find supporting
evidence for all of these explanations. We also find
that the crisis was certainly not due to excessive
spending relative to that of surrounding districts (see
sidebar on page 24 for details on city support, charter

Why the
district
has a money
problem

by JOHN CASKEY and MARK KUPERBERG
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Funding the Philadelphia Schools
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school enrollments, district spending, and teacher
salaries). We conclude that the unwieldy process
for financing the district mean that such crises are
bound to recur unless that process is changed.

Three specific events triggered the 2012 crisis: an
abrupt reduction in federal and state funding (see
Figure 1), the inability of the district to cut many
of its costs, and political pressures on the district
to spend available revenues in a given year.
Pennsylvania governor Tom Corbett signs the 2013–14 state budget on
In response to an earlier financial crisis, in
June 30, 2013
2001, the State of Pennsylvania took control of
the Philadelphia school district. The Republican governor at
When the recession began in late 2007, it severely reduced
the time worked with the Democratic mayor of Philadelphia
tax revenues at all levels of government. In order to preserve
to arrange a “friendly” takeover, which replaced the local
jobs and maintain educational spending, the federal governschool board with a five-member School Reform Commission
ment in early 2009 initiated an economic stimulus program.
(SRC). Three members are appointed by the governor and
About $113 million a year in 2010 and 2011 came directly
two by the mayor.
from the federal government to the school district, mainly
With no independent taxing authority, the district depends
as supplemental grants to enhance educational services for
for funding on annual allocations from the city, state, and
disadvantaged students. Other stimulus funds went to the
federal governments. Of the district’s $2.7 billion in revenues
state to allocate to school districts.
in 2013, 50 percent came from the state and 14 percent from
In 2010, the state faced reduced revenues and cut its
the federal government; city and local contributions made
own support for K–12 education but used the stimulus
up the remainder. In a typical year, the governor presents
funds to increase overall allocations to school districts. For
a draft state budget to the legislature in February, including
Philadelphia, combined state and federal funding grew by 10.2
allocations for K–12 education. In April, the district uses the
percent. Local funding for the district declined by 0.7 percent,
governor’s proposed budget and estimates what it will get from
but given the large share of state and federal funding, overall
the city to prepare its own draft budget. Much of the funding
district revenues still grew by 6.7 percent.
the School District of Philadelphia gets from the city is fairly
The subsequent fiscal year was similar, but the growth
predictable, but it must nevertheless appear before the city
in revenues was more constrained. Funding to the district
council in May to present a request for funds.
from state-generated revenues was essentially flat, but federal
From the perspective of the district, multiple sources of
funding increased by 13.3 percent, largely due to the stimulus
funding create three significant planning problems. First, the
package. Local funding fell by 2 percent. On net, the district’s
state legislature can alter the governor’s proposed budget.
total revenues grew by 2 percent. This modest increase created
Second, the city council may not grant the district’s request
budget pressures for the school district that required some

Of the district’s $2.7 billion in revenues in 2013, 50 percent came from the state and
14 percent from the federal government; city and local contributions made up the remainder.
for funds, especially any requests that go beyond its typical
allocations. When the allocations from the state and city
deviate from what the district expects, it must adjust its budget. Third, there is a “who goes first?” problem. In years when
the district appeals to the state and city for additional funding,
each is reluctant to pledge new funds without knowing how
much the other will commit. If one governmental entity steps
up, this reduces the burden on the laggard. Such gaming
between the city and state can leave the district uncertain
about its exact funding until well into its fiscal year.
22
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midyear cuts, but the district managed to end the fiscal year
with a small surplus.
District administrators clearly understood that the district’s
budget was heavily dependent on the state’s basic education
subsidy, and that the state had increased this subsidy in fiscal
years 2010 and 2011 by using federal stimulus funding. In
2010 and early 2011, district management warned repeatedly
that severe cuts would have to be made if the state or the
city did not increase support for K–12 education once the
federal stimulus funding ended in 2011. Arlene Ackerman,
educationnext.org
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who became superintendent in 2008 but would be forced out
in 2011, emphasized two factors that she thought might win
over legislators who were demanding greater school choice
and more accountability from traditional schools. Ackerman
pointed to the district’s support for the growing numbers of
students selecting charter schools and to rising test scores by
district students on the state’s standardized tests.

Spending Cuts

Political developments did not provide much hope for additional state funding, however. In November 2010, voters
elected Tom Corbett, a Republican, as governor, replacing
Ed Rendell, a Democrat. In addition, the Republican Party
gained control of both houses of the state legislature. Corbett
and many Republican state legislators had run on a “no new
tax” pledge. With the state still mired in the recession and the
end of federal stimulus funding, Corbett clearly had to cut
state spending to balance the budget.
The school district could not know exactly what Corbett
planned to do with the education budget, but it recognized

Revenue Shortfall

that a big increase in state funding to offset the elimination of
federal stimulus funding was unlikely. Almost immediately after
Corbett’s election, the School District of Philadelphia began
to make plans for how it might adjust to major budget cuts.
But the governor surprised the district (and school districts
throughout the state) in March 2011 when he proposed a state
budget that cut support for basic education by nearly 10 percent.
The termination of almost $1 billion in federal stimulus funding
for education in Pennsylvania was to be offset by only a very
modest replacement by the state. After heavy lobbying by school
districts around the state, Corbett and the state legislature settled
on a 7 percent cut in the basic education subsidy, but they also
made deep cuts to other state grants for education. Reductions
in state funding fell disproportionately on Philadelphia. The
district, which educates about 10 percent of the state’s children,
shouldered about 30 percent of the state cuts.
For Philadelphia, the end of the stimulus and the state’s
decision to offset only a small share of the federal cuts meant
a 14 percent drop in state and federal education funding
between 2011 and 2012. As the magnitude of the coming
funding cuts materialized, the district appealed to the city for

(Figure 2)

Despite rising over the decade, district revenues fell by 7 percent in 2012 when other funding failed to fully replace federal
funds provided by the stimulus package.
Funding sources and revenues, 2003–2013
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Philadelphia’s Support for Education
Many observers argue that the district is underfunded relative to its needs. This raises the question, is the City of Philadelphia
doing its fair share to fund its schools?
Figure S1 plots “local tax effort” as a function of “economic capacity” for the district and surrounding suburban districts. We
use suburban Philadelphia as the comparison group because labor costs are the overwhelming component of a school district’s
expenditures, and labor markets in education are local. We also include Pittsburgh, the state’s second-largest city. Pittsburgh
has more than double the economic capacity of Philadelphia ($320,844 vs. $150,776 per student).
Philadelphia’s position in Figure S1 indicates that its tax effort for education is about average for the metropolitan region, and is
similar to Pittsburgh’s. But Philadelphia’s relatively large distance from the line indicates that its financial support for education is low
compared to most other low-wealth districts. Had the city funded the district according to what would be predicted by the regression
line, Philadelphia’s contribution would have been 25.3 percent higher, generating $237 million in 2012, enough to have offset 80 percent of the decline in state and federal funding that year.
Charter Schools
Growing enrollment in charter schools is another factor in the district’s financial woes. State law requires districts to give charter schools
the same amount per pupil, roughly speaking, that traditional schools spent per pupil in the previous year, adjusted for the difference
between spending on regular and special
education students.
As the recession began, total enroll(Figure S1)
ment in the city’s public schools had been
declining for several years from enrollIn 2012, Philadelphia’s local tax effort was less than what would be predicted
ment of about 212,000 in 2003. While by
by its economic capacity and below average relative to most other low2009 total enrollment had hit a plateau at
wealth districts.
just under 200,000, district school enrollment continued to decline as increasing
Local tax effort 2011–12
numbers of students chose to attend
30
charter schools. Charter school enrollment rose from 30,350 in 2007 to 61,740
in 2013, as district school enrollment fell
25
from 169,697 to 136,929. Charter schools
currently educate 30 percent of public
school students in the district.
In theory, charter schools are costPittsburgh
20
neutral because they remove students from
the district and the associated operating
Philadelphia
costs in equal measure. In reality they are
15
not. Students rarely leave a traditional
public school in a quantity and grade level
that allows for the elimination of a class10
room, so it may be impossible in the short
0
200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000 1,200,000
run to lower teacher costs in line with the
Economic capacity
reduction in students. And some operating
NOTES: Equalized mills is a measure of local tax effort that reflects all locally generated tax revenue
expenses, such as those for principals and
divided by the district’s total property market value. Economic capacity is measured as a weighted
average of a district’s total personal income and property market value per student; 60 percent of the
building maintenance, cannot be reduced
weight is determined by market value of taxable property per student and the remaining 40 percent by
personal income.
unless an entire school is eliminated, which
is also difficult to achieve in the short run.
SOURCE : Pennsylvania Department of Education
Equalized mills

Tax Effort in Philadelphia, Its Suburbs, and Pittsburgh
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School Spending in Philadelphia, Its Suburbs, and
Pittsburgh (Figure S2)
Spending per student in Philadelphia is lower than in most of its suburbs, and far
lower than in Pittsburgh.
Current expenditure per student 2011–12
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Note: Current expenditures include spending on instruction, support services, and operations of noninstructional services but exclude facilities acquisitions and debt financing.
SOURCE : Pennsylvania Department of Education

Average Teacher Salaries Exceed $70,000 in 2012–13
(Table S1)

But Philadelphia teachers’ pay is below the average of the surrounding suburbs
and below the average in Pittsburgh.
Administrators

Teachers

Other
Professional
Staff

All
Professional
Staff

Suburban
Philadelphia

$122,279

$74,706

$80,485

$77,635

Pittsburgh

$109,058

$73,483

$83,233

$76,274

Philadelphia

$129,574

$70,790

$74,143

$73,548

SOURCE : Authors’ calculations based on data from the Pennsylvania Department of Education

educationnext.org

District Spending
Figure S2 compares per-pupil current
expenditures in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
and Philadelphia’s Pennsylvania suburbs. It shows that Philadelphia spends
far less than the suburban districts,
but roughly in line with its economic
capacity. Only a handful of suburban
districts spend less than Philadelphia.
Pittsburgh spends far more per pupil
than Philadelphia—in fact, Pittsburgh
is the second-highest-spending school
district in the comparison group.
The contract approved in early 2010
gave teachers a 3 percent raise in September 2010 and a 3 percent raise in
January 2012, in addition to a 4 percent
raise received in March 2009. These
increases raise the question of whether
district teachers are overpaid. As Table
S1 shows, in 2013 the average teacher
salary in Philadelphia was 5.3 percent
lower than the average in surrounding
suburbs, and 3.6 percent lower than
in Pittsburgh, where the cost of living
is substantially less. Philadelphia does
pay its administrators more, but they
are managing a school district that is
7 times larger than Pittsburgh’s and 10
times larger than the largest suburban
school district.
Differences in employment benefits
close some of the compensation gap.
In Philadelphia, teachers do not contribute anything toward the cost of
health insurance for themselves and
their dependents. Available data for
surrounding suburbs from a National
Council on Teacher Quality report,
Teacher Quality Roadmap: Improving
Policies and Practices in the School
District of Philadelphia, indicate that it
was common for suburban teachers to
pay $1,000 to $2,000 in 2013 for family
health insurance.
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Workforce Cuts

(Figure 3)
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additional revenues to help it head off drastic disruptions to
its educational program. The city responded by increasing its
funding and other local revenue to the district by 11.3 percent.
The net result, however, was an almost 7 percent decline in
district revenue (see Figure 2).

Limited Options

The school district had to cut spending, but much of the
district’s budget is fixed in the short run. Collective bargaining
agreements set the scale for salaries and benefits. The federal
government mandates certain levels of special education services. State law and enrollments govern how much the district
must transfer to charter schools. School buildings must be
heated and maintained. Bond issuances determine required
debt payments. In fact, the district estimates that between 66
and 80 percent of its expenses are predetermined from one

of classroom teachers had declined, but the student-to-teacher
ratio had held relatively stable as the district lost students to
charters and other schools. In 2010 and 2011, the district added
teachers while continuing to lose students, and student-toteacher ratios dropped dramatically. But when the stimulus
funding ended and the state failed to replace those funds, the
district decided to cut its workforce by almost 17 percent (see
Figure 3), which would save more than $300 million annually.
The district also netted one-time savings of well over $100
million, mainly from a debt refinancing, and it pushed some
expenses into the subsequent fiscal year. It delayed $42 million in payments into a union health plan and borrowed
$35 million from the regional transportation authority. Such
measures simply postponed the need for additional cuts.
The tight financial situation continued into 2013, but the
district avoided significant cuts that year by borrowing $302
million in the bond market. Much of this went to cover the

The largest component of educational expenditure is personnel,
so it is not surprising that the district looked to the workforce for potential cuts.
year to the next, and many of these costs, such as negotiated
wage contracts, increase automatically. Thus, the 7 percent
decline in total operating revenues in fiscal year 2012 fell
heavily on a small portion of the overall budget.
The largest component of educational expenditure is personnel, so it is not surprising that the district looked to the workforce
for potential cuts. Between 2003 and 2009, district employment
26

ED U C A T I O N N E X T / F A L L 2 0 1 4

short-term debts the district had incurred in the previous year.
Recognizing that it could not continue to borrow to cover
operating costs, the SRC announced that it would close almost
10 percent of the district’s 240 schools in 2013. For several years,
the SRC had been closing schools, but well below the rate the
schools were losing students. Every announced school closing
was vociferously contested by supporters of that school.
educationnext.org
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In 2013 the relatively new superintendent, William R. Hite,
announced that schools might not open on time if they could
not be adequately staffed. Committed to a balanced budget, Hite
and the SRC put forth a “doomsday” budget that severely cut the
number of noontime aides, counselors, and teachers, and created
“split” classrooms, that is, classrooms with two grade levels in the
same room. That summer, the district mailed layoff notices to
nearly 3,800 employees. At the same time, the SRC asked the city
for $60 million in additional funding, the state for $120 million,
and its unions for $133 million in labor concessions. The city
pledged to find $50 million in additional revenue for the schools.
Exactly how the city would come up with this money was still to
be determined, but the pledge was sufficient for the district to
reinstate 1,600 laid-off employees and open on schedule.

undermine its case. Finally, prior to the November 2010
election, the district assumed that the state would largely
replace the federal funding that the state used to maintain its
support for K–12 education during the recession. It did not
anticipate that the state would continue its reduced level of
funding and cut state grants to the district. But once federal
stimulus funding ended and the state and city refused to
step up, the district was, like the Coyote in the Road Runner
cartoon, standing on thin air.

Conclusion

PHOTO / AP PHOTO / PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, RACHEL WISNIEWSKI

Despite a vibrant downtown, Philadelphia is a much
poorer city than many people realize. With one-quarter of
its residents living below the poverty level, Philadelphia is
the ninth-poorest U.S. city with a
Could the Crisis
population over 250,000. Relative
Have Been Avoided?
to Pittsburgh and the Philadelphia
Critics of the district management
suburbs, the school district is sigargue that the administration should
nificantly underfunded by the state
have cut costs in order to conserve
and its city government, especially
resources and prepare for the prewhen one adjusts for the comparadictable end of the stimulus money,
tively large percentages of special
even when, relatively speaking, fundeducation, English language learning was flush. It certainly did not do
ers, and low-income students. In
this. When the district had sufficient
short, the district faces huge chalfunds prior to 2011, it agreed to a
lenges with limited resources.
series of wage increases for union
In addition to this fundamenemployees, added remedial summertal fiscal weakness, the district is
school classes, reduced class sizes,
undermined by its governance
operated underutilized buildings,
structure. With no independent
and devoted extra resources to
taxing authority, every year the
improve poorly performing schools.
district administration must
Some of these measures could be
plead for funding from the state
quickly reversed, but some created
and city. As with the boy who
ongoing commitments.
cried wolf, the politicians who
People who defend the district’s Philadelphia school district superintendent William R.
hear the message repeatedly
spending prior to the crisis point Hite speaks about the proposed fiscal year 2015 operating become skeptical. In addition, the
to a number of institutional and budget at a press conference on April 25, 2014
city and state have an incentive to
political realities. For one, the feddelay committing funds as long as
eral stimulus funding that came directly to the district had
possible in the hope that the other will take the lead.
to be used for program enhancements, that is, the district
In the summer of 2014, the district once again faces a dire
had very limited legal ability to “bank” the funds. Moreover,
fiscal situation and is appealing to the city and state to rescue
graduation rates in the district are strikingly low, as is student
the schools. The danger is that the district may have entered
performance on standardized tests. SRC members and state
a vicious cycle in which persistent financial crises encourand local politicians naturally pushed the district to improve
age more parents to leave the city or move their children to
these metrics. The school district’s response was to spend
charter schools, further undermining the district’s financing
available funds on initiatives that might help in the short run,
and reinforcing the exodus of students.
even if it left the district vulnerable in the long run. And, as
noted earlier, the district must approach the state and city
John Caskey and Mark Kuperberg are professors in the
each year with its hat in hand to ask for resources. If it did
department of economics at Swarthmore College. Erica Kouka
so while banking previously appropriated funds, this would
provided research assistance.
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